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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
submitted that the theory adopted by the court in the principal case,
supplemented by the retrospective valuation formula suggested herein,
will be adequate as long as the section 1378 right remains an element
in condemnation proceedings.
UNCONSCIONABILITY IN CONSUMER SALES
CONTRACTS-A DEFENSE TO ACTIONS AT LAW,
AND UNDER THE UCC
Plaintiff, operator of a retail furniture store, sold a five hundred
dollar stereo set on installment contract to defendant Williams, know-
ing that defendant supported herself and seven children on a two
hundred eighteen dollar monthly welfare payment.' At the time de-
fendant bought the set, she owed plaintiff one hundred sixty four
dollars on thirteen prior purchases.2 The form contract provided that
plaintiff would retain title to all items purchased until the purchaser
had paid all amounts due in full, and that the debt on each item was
secured by the right to repossess all items purchased.' When defendant
defaulted shortly after purchasing the stereo, plaintiff sued to replevy
all items purchased by her since 1957. The trial court granted judg-
ment for plaintiff, rejecting defendant's contention that the contract
was not enforceable because unconscionable. The District of Columbia
Court of Appeals affirmed. The United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia reversed, and remanded for the taking of evidence
1 The name of defendant's social worker and the amount of her monthly stipend
were written on the back of the contract.
- Since December 1957, defendant had purchased thirteen items for a total of $1800.
'The contract set out the value of the item and purported to lease it to the
purchaser for a monthly rental payment. However, title was to pass to the purchaser
when the total of the payments made equalled the stated value. The contract further
provided that:
the amount of each periodical installment payment to be made by [purchaser]
to the Company under this present lease shall be inclusive of and not in
addition to the amount of each installment payment to be made by [purchaser]
under such prior leases, bills or accounts; and all payments now and hereafter
made by [purchaser] shall be credited pro rata of all outstanding leases, bills
and accounts due the Company by [purchaser] at the time each such payment
is made.
The court analyzed the provision as follows, 350 F.2d at 447:
The effect of this rather obscure provision was to keep a balance due on every
item purchased until the balance due on all items, whenever purchased, was
liquidated. As a result, the debt incurred at the time of purchase of each item
was secured by the right to repossess all the items previously purchased by
the same purchaser, and each new item mrchased automatically became subjeci
to a security interest arising out of the previous dealings.
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on possible unconscionability. Held: A contract is unenforceable if
there was present an element of unconscionability at the time the con-
tract was made. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d
445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).1
Traditionally, the equitable defense of unconscionability has been
available in actions at law only in regard to contracts "such as no man
in his senses and not under delusion would make on the one band,
and as no honest and fair man would accept on the other."' The
courts' refusal to extend the defense to other types of contracts has
generally been attributed to their respect for the principle of freedom
of contract. 7 In practice, however, courts have frequently avoided
enforcement of unconscionable contracts by strained interpretation
of the contractual provisions, and by manipulation of the flexible
doctrines of assent, mutuality, and consideration.' To avoid the diffi-
culties inherent in such approaches to the problem,9 and to make it
possible for the courts "to police explicitly against the contracts or
'Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Company, 198 A.2d 914 (D.C. Ct. App.
1964). The court explained its rejection of defendant's contention of unconscionability
as follows, id. at 916:
We cannot condemn too strongly appellee's conduct. It raises serious questions
of sharp practice and irresponsible business dealings. A review of the legis-
lation in the District of Columbia affecting retail sales and the pertinent decisions
of the highest court of this jurisdiction disclose, however, no ground upon which
this court can declare the contracts in question contrary to public policy .... We
think Congress should consider corrective legislation to protect the public from
such exploitive contracts as were utilized in the case at bar.
t54 GEo. L. J. 703 (1966), 79 HaRv. L. REv. 1299 (1966), 17 So. CaR. L. RE%.
774 (1965).
'Earl of Chesterfield v. Janssen, 2 Ves. 125, 155, 28 Eng. Rep. 82, 100 (Ch. 1750).
Accord, Thornborow v. Whitacre, 2 Ld. Raym. 1164, 92 Eng. Rep. 270 (K. B. 1706) ;
James v. Morgan, 1 Lev. 111, 83 Eng. Rep. 323 (K. B. 1664); Flume v. United States,
132 U. S. 406 (1889) (dictum).
See, e.g., Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of
Contract, 43 COLUm. L. REv. 629, 633, 637 (1943); Llewellyn, Book Review, 52
HARV. L. REv. 700, 702 (1939) ; Note, 45 IowA L. REv. 843, 844-45 (1960).
'1 CoRBIN, CONTRACTS § 128 (1963) ; LLEWELLYN, THE COMON LAW TarITor-
DECIDING APPEALS 364-65 (1960); Llewellyn, Book Review, supra note 7, at 702.
'Professor Llewellyn pointed out the difficulties in his Book Review, supra note
7, at 703 (1939) :
First, since they all rest on the admission that the clauses in question are
permissible in purpose and content, they invite the draftsman to recur to the
attack. . . . Second, since they do not face the issue, they fail to accumulate
either experience or authority in the needed direction; that of marking out
for any given type of transaction what the minimum decencies are which a
court will insist upon as essential to an enforceable bargain of a given type ....
Third, since they purport to construe, and do not really construe, nor are intended
to, but are instead tools of intentional and creative misconstruction they seriously
embarrass later efforts at true construction, later efforts to get at the true
meaning of those wholly legitimate contracts and clauses which call for their
true meaning to be got at instead of avoided. The net effort is unnecessary
confusion and unpredictability, together with inadequate remedy, and evil persisting
that calls for remedy. Covert tools are never reliable tools.
[VOL. 41 :601
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clauses which they find to be unconscionable,"1 ° section 2-302 was
included in the Uniform Commercial Code: 1
(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the
contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court
may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of
the contract without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the
application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable
result.
(2) When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract or any
clause thereof may be unconscionable the parties shall be afforded a rea-
sonable opportunity to present evidence as to its commercial setting,
purpose and effect to aid the court in making the determination.
The court in the principal case approached the issue, whether to
refuse enforcement to unconscionable contracts, as a matter of first
impression. From decisions in other jurisdictions, the court observed
that the idea that unconscionable bargains should not be fully en-
forced was neither novel12 nor uncommon.3  Although the Uniform
Commercial Code was not enacted in the District of Columbia until
after the contract in issue had been executed, 4 the court reasoned
that enactment of section 2-302 did not necessarily change the law,
nor preclude the court from adopting a similar rule "in the exercise
of its powers to develop the common law." 5 The court concluded
that, in the absence of prior authority on the question, the enactment
of section 2-302 supplied persuasive authority for following the ration-
ale of the cases from which the section was derived.'
"Uniform Commercial Code [hereinafter cited as UCC] § 2-302, Comment 1.
"I1WASH. Rmr. COD § 62A.2-302 (1965). California enacted the UCC without this
section.
" The court cites, 350 F.2d at 448 n.3: Hume v. United States, 132 U.S. 406 (1889)(dictum) (discussion of English authorities); Scott v. United States, 79 U.S. (12
NVall.) 443 (1870) ; Schnell v. Nell, 17 Ind. 29 (1861) ; Luing v. Peterson, 143 Minn.
6, 172 N.W. 692 (1919) ; Greer v. Tweed 13 Abb. Pr. (n.s.) (N.Y.C.P. 1872).
" For this proposition, the court cites, 350 F2d at 448 n.2: Campbell Soup
Co. v. Wentz, 172 F.2d 80 (3d Cir. 1948); Indianapolis Morris Plan Corp. v.
Sparks, 132 Ind. App. 145, 172 N.E2d 899 (1961); Henningsen v. Bloomfield
Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960). Of the three, only Henningsen
directly supports the proposition that enforcement in actions at law may be refused
on grounds of unconscionability. Campbell Soup was an action for specific per-
formance, and the court stated that, had the action been at law, its decision. would
have been different. In Indianapolis Morris Plai, the court refused enforcement
for lack of consideration, and indicated that, although it would have liked to hold the
clauses in question void as against public policy, it was unable to do so because it
could conceive of situations in which such clauses could be valid.
" The UCC was enacted on December 30, 1963, and went into effect on January
1, 1965. 77 Stat. 630 (1963). The contract in question was executed in April of
1962.
350 F.2d at 449.
"See UCC § 2-302, Comment 1.
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The primary importance of the decision in the principal case lies
in the court's discussion of unconscionability. Since the term "un-
conscionable" is not defined in the Uniform Commercial Code,'17 the
court's analysis provides valuable precedent for cases subsequently
arising under section 2-302. The court's conception of unconscion-
ability is comprised of two major components: "absence of meaningful
choice on the part of one of the parties," and "contract terms which
are unreasonably favorable to the other party." 8
The question of meaningful choice in the context of form contracts
normally arises in relation to particular clauses of a contract, rather
than to the transaction as a whole. 9 "Absence of meaningful choice,"
as used by the court in the principal case, may mean either that the
purchaser had no choice as to inclusion of particular clauses in the
contract, or that he exercised no choice as to their inclusion because
he was unaware of their meaning, full import, or presence.2 0 In ex-
ploring this first component of unconscionability, the court stressed
several factors which may lead to the conclusion that the purchaser
either had no choice, or exercised no choice.
The relative bargaining power of the parties is the most important
factor in determining whether the purchaser had any choice as to the
inclusion of particular clauses in the contract. The court in the prin-
cipal case pointed out that "in many cases the meaningfulness of the
choice is negated by a gross inequality of bargaining power." 2' Hen-
ningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.21 furnishes an example of such a
situation. On grounds of unconscionability, the court in Henningsen
refused to enforce an express warranty, coupled with a disclaimer of
all other warranties, in a contract for the sale of a new automobile,
as a limitation of liability.3 The warranty involved was used by all
IT For discussions of § 2-302, see 58 DIcK. L. R.v. 161 (1954) ; 45 IowA L. REv.
843 (1960) ; 18 U. CHi. L. Rav. 146 (1950) ; 45 VA. L. Rav. 583 (1959).
350 F.2d at 449.
The typical consumer sales contract transaction may be divided analytically
into two parts: the bargained-for items such as price, quantity, and quality; the
written form containing the collateral provisions which limit the seller's risks
and promote his security. Typically, it is as to these collateral provisions that the
question of meaningful choice arises. LLEWELLYN, op. cit. supra note 8, at 371;
Llewellyn, supra note 8, at 700; 18 U. CH. L. REv. 146-47 (1950).
' See 350 F.2d at 449.
"350 F.2d at 449.
=-32 N. J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
"The warranty clause read, 161 A.2d at 74:
The manufacturer warrants each new motor vehicle (including original equip-
ment placed thereon by the manufacturer except tires), chassis or parts manu-
factured by it to be free from defects in material or workmanship under
normal use and service. Its obligation under this warranty being limited to
making good at its factory any part or parts thereof which shall, within ninety
[VOL. 41:601
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major American automobile manufacturers and dealers. Thus, if the
purchaser wished to buy an American automobile, he had no choice
but to accept the warranty. The gross inequality of bargaining power
between the individual consumer and the automobile industry pre-
cluded any choice by the consumer as to inclusion or exclusion of
the warranty clause.
Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz24 furnishes another example of a case
in which meaningful choice was largely vitiated by inequality of
bargaining power. In Campbell, the court refused to grant specific
performance of a contract to grow and deliver carrots because Camp-
bell Soup Co. had driven "too hard a bargain and too one-sided an
agreement."2 5 Campbell had used its superior bargaining power to
allocate virtually all risks of performance to the grower.
Several factors are important in determining whether a purchaser
exercised any choice as to the particular clauses in the contract.
Basically, the question is whether the purchaser had a reasonable
opportunity to understand the terms of the contract.27 His education
is obviously relevant. The language used may be crucial. If it is
either unintelligible to a layman,28 or misleading as to the import of
the clause, 09 the purchaser may not have been able to understand it.
(90) days after delivery of such vehicle to the original purchaser or before
such vehicle has been driven 4,000 miles, whichever event shall first occur,
be returned to it with transportation charges prepaid and which its examination
shall disclose to its satisfaction to have been thus defective; this warranty being
expressly in lieu of all other warranties expressed or implied, and all other
obligations or liabilities on its part ....
2'172 F.2d 80 (3d Cir. 1948), 58 YALE L. J. 1161 (1949).
-YId. at 83.
' The court's emphasis on bargaining power as an important determinant of uncon-
scionability may be interestingly compared with the statement in Comment 1 to § 2-302:
The principle is one of the prevention of oppression and unfair surprise
(Cf. Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz ... ) and not of disturbance of allocation of
risks because of superior bargaining power.
It is argued in a note, 45 IowA L. REv. 843, 849, 862 (1960), that a literal
interpretation of this Comment would largely vitiate the more significant potential-
ities of § 2-302 because "the problem of unconscionable contracts is inseparably
linked to the problem of controlling economic bargaining power." However, the
author suggests that citation of the Wentz case introduces an ambiguity into the
Comment which a progressive court can justifiably exploit to develop "an effective
tool for dealing with the central problem in unconscionable commercial contracts-
the control of disproportionate economic power." Although the court in the principal
case did not discuss this ambiguity, it may be inferred from its emphasis on
bargaining power that it is a "progressive court."
" 350 F.2d at 449.
' The "add-on" clause used in the principal case, reprinted supra note 3, was
couched in language which would seem unintelligible to the average layman.
I In Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69, 92-93
(1960), the court pointed out that, although an ordinary layman reading the warranty
(reprinted supra note 23) might well conclude that the manufacturer would replace
defective parts within a specified period only, he would not realize that, by accepting
19661
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Other factors which are indicative of the purchaser's opportunity
to understand the terms of the contract are the size of the print used
and the placement of critical clauses on the form. An extreme example
of a contract form which gave the purchaser little opportunity to
understand its terms was New Prague Flouring Mill Co. v. Spears,30 in
which a four thousand word contract was printed on one eight-by-five
inch sheet of paper.
Sales practices may also be used to divert the purchaser's attention
from important clauses in the contract, and thus deprive him of a
reasonable opportunity to understand the terms of the contract. All
of these factors-sales practices, bargaining power, purchaser's educa-
tion, print size, clause placement, language-must be considered to-
gether with all other circumstances 3' surrounding the transaction in
order to determine whether there was "an absence of meaningful
choice on the part of one of the parties."
The second major component of the court's concept of uncon-
scionability--"contract terms which are unreasonably favorable to the
other party"-must also be determined in light of all the circumstances
surrounding the transaction.32 However, not only the immediate cir-
cumstances, but also the general commercial background and needs
of the trade must be considered.33 The court recognized that a test
for determining reasonableness could not be simple, or mechanically
applied.34 Although not faced with the question of reasonableness,15
the court adopted the test suggested by Professor Corbin: whether
the terms are "so extreme as to appear unconscionable according to
the mores and business practices of the time and place."3" Although
the court did not devote much discussion to this component of un-
conscionability, it would seem to be fully as important as the absence
of meaningful choice.
In the context of consumer sales contracts, the determination of
meaningful choice depends on the peculiar characteristics of the in-
the warranty, he gave up any personal injury claim arising from a defective automobile.
The court stated that "the draftsmanship is reflective of the care and skill of the
Automobile Manufacturers Association in undertaking to avoid warranty obligations
without drawing too much attention to its effort in that regard."
' 194 Iowa 417, 189 N.W. 815 (1922).
" Another circumstance, which would obviously be relevant in the principal
case, was that the seller knew of defendant's financial condition. See note 2 supra.
350 F.2d at 450.
See UCC § 2-302, Comment 1.
"350 F.2d at 450.
Since no findings as to possible unconscionability had been made below, the court
remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings.
' 1 CORBI"N, CON RACTS § 128 (1963).
[VOL. 41 : 601
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dividual purchaser. Because of the individualized nature of the deter-
mination whether a purchaser had a meaningful choice, a determina-
tion that this first component of unconscionability is present will
seldom have wider application than to the case before the courtY
On the other hand, a determination that the terms of the contract
are unreasonably favorable to the seller will apply to all similar terms
in that trade, because unreasonableness is determined by the com-
mercial background. Thus, a finding that the second component of
unconscionability is present has a potentially far greater impact on
the business community than a finding that the first component is
present.
The decision in the principal case raises interesting questions as
to how much care the court will require of the seller. How much care
must he take to insure the purchaser of a reasonable opportunity to
understand the terms of the contract? Must he explain, at his peril,
the contract provisions? Is he bound to inquire into the purchaser's
education and financial status? A partial answer to these questions
may be found in the comment to section 2-302: "The principle is
one of the prevention of oppression and unfair surprise . .. ." One
commentator concluded that "unconscionable," as used in the Code,
"is roughly equivalent to 'grossly unfair'. '3 It would seem that,
under section 2-302, the courts will require the seller to refrain from
grossly overreaching the purchaser, but will not require him to inquire
into any peculiar characteristics of the purchaser which are not known
or obvious to the seller. Beyond this, further development must be
left to the courts in case-by-case application of section 2-302.
The court's adoption of the Corbin test raises a question as to
what it would do with contract terms which are socially undesirable,
but commercially useful and widespread." Professor Llewellyn has
argued that the greatest social need regarding adhesion or form con-
tracts is for the courts to spell out the minimum decencies required
in commercial transactions. 40 He suggested that: 41
[W]here bargaining is absent in fact, the conditions and clauses to be
' On the other hand, a finding, such as that in Henningsen, that the purchaser
had no effective choice because of his inferior bargaining position would probably apply
to almost all other individual consumers.
Note, 45 IowA L. REv. 843, 849 (1960).
C'The warranty clause in Henningsen, supra note 23, is a good example of a
socially undesirable clause, but yet reasonable when measured by commercial prac-
tices.
"Llewellyn, supra note 8, at 703.
"Id. at 704.
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read into a bargain are not those which happen to be printed on the
unread paper, but are those which a sane man might reasonably expect
to find on that paper. The background of trade practice gives a first
indication; the line of authority rejecting unreasonable practice offers the
needed corrective.
Thus, although deference would be given to the commercial back-
ground, a commercially reasonable, but socially undesirable, contract
provision could be refused enforcement when there was an absence of
meaningful choice.42
Such an approach at present may be too disruptive of commercial
practices, however.43 In this initial stage of development of the con-
cept of unconscionability under the Code,44 the court's adoption of
the Corbin test may represent a wise use of judicial discretion to
proceed gradually. If it later appears that there are serious abuses
of freedom of contract through widespread commercial practices, which
cannot be remedied under the Corbin test, it will be time enough to
adopt another test giving more weight to consumer needs.
' See 54 GEo. L.J. 703, 708 (1966) for a brief discussion of the importance of
the principal case in giving to indigents needed protection from unethical business
practices which are not prohibited by statute.
' The dissent in the principal case, 350 F.2d at 450, emphasizes the need for
a cautious approach to the problem of unconscionable contracts in light of the
great latitude which the law has for so long allowed the parties in making contracts,
and in light of the thousands of consumer installment credit transactions which
will be affected.
" American Home Improvement, Inc. v. MacIver, 105 N.H. 435, 201 A.2d 886
(1964), appears to be the only case decided under § 2-302 to date.
[VOL. 41 :601
